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Abstract 
While children understand intentions to joke and pretend by 2 or 3 years, it is unclear whether 
they distinguish these intentional acts. Using a normativity paradigm, we found (N=72) 2-
year-olds protest against jokes more than pretending, suggesting, for the first time, they 
distinguish these acts. Furthermore, toddlers protested more generally after pretend than 
literal or joke contexts, but only if intentional cues were used. Additionally, children objected 
more to joking than pretending after pretend and literal contexts, but not after joke contexts. 
Thus toddlers distinguish the intentional nature of pretending and joking. Furthermore, a 
pretend intentional context establishes specific rules to be followed, while a joke intentional 
context allows an open space to perform various types of acts. 
Keywords: Pretend, Joke, Wrong, Action, Normativity, Cultural Evolution 
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Two-Year-Olds Distinguish Pretending and Joking 
From infancy, humans understand what typical, or normative, acts look like (e.g., 
Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010; Reid, et al., 2009). However 
in a world which requires flexible thinking to push forward new innovations, humans must 
also understand the value of atypical acts – those which may appear to be wrong compared to 
the norm (e.g., Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Kim, 2006; McAdam & McClelland, 2002; Mesoudi, 
Whiten, & Laland, 2004). Even more, humans must understand that different types of wrong 
acts have different meanings – pretending, jokes, lies, metaphors, and irony are all wrong, but 
people produce these different wrong acts for different reasons (Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; 
Hoicka, Jutsum, & Gattis, 2008; Leekam, 1991). Without the ability to navigate this complex 
world containing both normative and wrong acts, it would be difficult to know when to learn, 
bond, trust, or imagine (e.g., Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Harris & Kavanaugh, 
1993; Lynch, 2002; Sutherland & Friedman, 2012). 
One question is whether young children really distinguish different types of wrong 
acts, each with their own meaning, or whether they view all wrong acts as the same. Research 
using verbal tasks found that from around 7 or 8 years, but not younger, children differentiate 
irony from lies (Andrews, Rosenblatt, Malkus, Gardner, & Winner, 1986; Winner & Leekam, 
1991). Other verbal tasks found children distinguish joking and lying from around 5 or 6 
years (Leekam, 1991; Sullivan, Winner, & Hopfield, 1995), and pretending and lying from 
around 4 years (Taylor, Lussier, & Maring, 2003). As well as requiring verbal comprehension 
and production skills (since lying was used as a comparison to the other types of intentions) 
most of these tasks required children to understand second-order mental states (e.g., intending 
for someone else to believe/not believe information). These task demands would make such a 
task impossible for 2-year-olds to pass. By using an action-based task instead of a verbal task, 
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and reducing the socio-cognitive demands, younger children may distinguish different types 
of wrong acts. 
Two types of wrong acts that young children encounter on a regular basis are 
pretending and joking. Pretense begins to develop as early as 15 months, and continues to 
develop and change until around 4 years (e.g., Bosco, Friedman, & Leslie, 2006; Harris & 
Kavanaugh, 1993; Howes & Matheson, 1992; Howes, Unger, & Seidner, 1989; McCune-
Nicholich, 1981; Onishi, Baillargeon, & Leslie, 2007). Humor begins to develop in the first 
year, and continues to develop and change throughout childhood (e.g., Addyman & 
Addyman, 2013; Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011, 2012; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Hoicka, et al., 2008; 
Hoicka & Wang, 2011; Loizou, 2005; McGhee, 1979; Mireault, et al., 2012; Mireault, et al., 
2014; Reddy, 2001; Sroufe & Wunsch, 1972). From 3 years, pre-schoolers understand 
intentions to pretend (e.g., Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2004). Children copy actions 
which are technically wrong, such as “coloring” with a marker with the cap still on, if cued as 
pretending rather than cued as trying. From 2 years, they distinguish intentions to pretend 
from trying after receiving training (Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006). From 2 years toddlers 
understand humorous intentions (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). Toddlers 
copy wrong actions, such as putting a hat over one’s eyes, when cued as a joke versus when 
cued as a mistake. Both pretending and joking involve the cognitive ability to distinguish 
when an act is normative or wrong. However, unlike lying, the extra demands are limited (see 
Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). For joking, at its most basic, one must recognize that a wrong act 
was intentionally performed, and perhaps understand the act was meant to be playful (e.g., 
Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). For pretending, one must also understand that the wrong act is right 
in a possible world, i.e., that if the counterfactual world was true, the act would be right (e.g., 
Nichols & Stich, 2003).  
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Additionally, recent research suggests 16-to 24-month-olds distinguish when their 
parents pretend or joke (Hoicka & Butcher, in press). Across two studies, parents acted out 
specific joke and pretend acts for their toddlers. For instance, they might pretend to drink 
from an empty cup, or they might joke that they are drinking by putting a cup of water to 
their elbow, following typical instances of joking and pretending in this age group. Even 
though both acts were technically wrong, toddlers showed more belief through their actions 
(e.g., repeating target actions) during pretend versus joke contexts. However these behaviors 
were driven, at least in part, by parents’ behaviors, as children’s dis/belief was expressed 
more often than not within 5 seconds of parents’ corresponding dis/belief. Thus the ability to 
distinguish joking and pretending must be assessed in a purely experimental setting. Thus if a 
non-verbal paradigm was used, focussing on two simpler forms of wrong acts, pretending and 
joking, it may be possible to determine whether young children distinguish different types of 
wrong acts. This would suggest they have some understanding of their underlying meanings. 
A growing body of research demonstrates that from 2 years children understand a 
great deal about normativity. They expressly state when one person does an act which 
violates the current schema. Research found 2- and 3-year-olds protest, critique, and teach 
when others act wrong as a mistake (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008), or even when 
others violate a pretend schema, e.g., if a sponge has been established to be a pretend bread 
roll, children protest when it is being used as another object, including a sponge (Rakoczy, 
2008; Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2009). Children may reinforce wrong acts in the 
pretend tasks because they have a deep understanding of pretense, including the idea that a 
wrong act must represent a normative act. Alternatively, children may enforce the last 
intentional action they saw with an object (even if a wrong action), without fully 
understanding why someone would perform these wrong actions.   
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To determine whether young children really understand the meanings behind different 
types of wrong acts, or whether they simply understand that sometimes we do things wrong 
on purpose, without understanding why, we must directly compare how young children treat 
two types of wrong acts. Pretending and joking are ideal as children come across these acts in 
everyday interactions from toddlerhood (pretending) or infancy (joking), and so should be 
familiar contexts for 2-year-olds. In this study we took advantage of the types of responses 
children give in normativity tasks (i.e., protesting; Rakoczy, 2008; Rakoczy, et al., 2008; 
Wyman, et al., 2009) to determine, for the first time, whether young children distinguish 
pretending and joking. An Experimenter (E1) either pretended or joked with the child. Then 
another experimenter (E2) entered the room and asked to play. E1 left the room and then E2 
pretended and joked (all different actions to those of E1). Crucially, we ran two versions of 
this task. One condition involved E1 giving cues that she was pretending (saying she was 
pretending; sound effects) or joking (saying she was joking; laughter), and E2 also giving 
cues (pretend: sound effects; joking: laughter). In the other condition, E1 and E2 gave no 
clear cues they were joking or pretending, i.e., they just smiled no matter what they did.  
Since intentional cues allow 2-year-olds to understand intentions to pretend (with 
training), and joke (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 
2006), we expected children to distinguish the intentional contexts when cues were used, but 
not when no cues were used. This would indicate that intentional cues allow children to 
understand the intentions, and hence the meanings, behind the wrong actions. Since 
pretending provides a normative structure (e.g., Wyman, et al., 2009) and joking encourages 
creativity, and hence openness to ideas (Ziv, 1983), we predicted toddlers might object more 
in general after E1 expressed intentions to pretend versus intentions to joke. Alternatively, if 
toddlers view both pretend and joke intentional contexts as situations invoking specific norms 
to pretend or joke respectively, we would expect toddlers to object to joking more than 
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pretending after a pretend context was established, but we would expect the opposite pattern 
after a joke context was established.  
We also ran two follow-up studies to better understand our main results. In the first 
study, E1 acted literally, while E2 joked and pretended (with cues). This was to determine 
whether children distinguish pretending from literal intentional contexts. In the second study, 
E1 pretended (with cues), while E2 also pretended (with cues). However, half of E2’s actions 
were exactly the same as E1’s, and half were different, to examine how specific norm-
expectations are. 
Study 1a 
The goal of the first study was to determine whether 2-year-olds distinguish 
pretending and joking. We chose a naturalistic design, where both experimenters provided 
cues that they were pretending (e.g., saying, “I’m pretending…”, sound effects) or joking 
(e.g., saying “I’m joking…”, laughter), to give children the best possible chance of making 
this distinction. We also tested a separate group of children on a less naturalistic design where 
no cues were given (since parents generally do give cues that they are joking or pretending, 
Hoicka & Butcher, in press; Hoicka & Gattis, 2012; Hoicka, Jutsum, & Gattis, 2008; Lillard, 
et al., 2007; Lillard &  Witherington, 2004; Mireault, et al., 2012; Reissland & Snow, 1998) 
to determine whether children responded to the actions only, or the intentions in relation to 
the action (signalled by cues). If only actions are important, we would expect the same results 
across both conditions with and without cues. If cues are important to understanding the 
intentions, we would expect interactions between the cues and contexts. 
Method 
Participants. There were 58 two-year-olds (M = 30 months, 16 days, SD = 3 months, 
15 days, Range  = 24 months, 13 days – 35 months, 15 days, 26 male). One of the parents did 
not give the child’s exact date of birth. Fourty-three children were Caucasian, 2 were of 
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mixed ethnicity, and 13 parents did not report their child’s ethnicity. Thirty-seven children 
lived in England, and 21 lived in Scotland. Parents had a Postgraduate degree (17), 
Undergraduate degree (18), High School diploma (7), or not reported (16). One additional 
participant was excluded due to non-cooperation and one was excluded due to experimental 
error. Participants were recruited from parent and toddler groups, posters, online advertising 
on parent websites, and a Bounty Pack mail-out (where parents’ addresses were bought from 
a company). Children were randomly assigned to each condition. The study was approved by 
the Psychology Department’s ethics committee, and parents signed a written consent form. 
Materials. The objects comprised a tea set including a teapot, tea cups, saucers, side 
plates, a plastic knife, teaspoon, dishwashing bowl and sponge. Sessions were video-recorded 
with a Sony Handycam. 
Design. The experiment was a between-subjects and within-subjects design.  The 
between-subjects independent variables were whether the initial context involved joking or 
pretending, and whether or not the experimenters gave cues to joking or pretending 
throughout the experiment. The within-subjects independent variable was whether the test 
actions involved joking or pretending. Each participant was trained in one of two contexts: 
pretending, which involved four pretend actions, or joking, which involved four joke actions.  
Pretend actions were designed to resemble prototypical pretense in early development, and, 
importantly, not to look like jokes (e.g., McCune-Nicolich, 1981). Similarly, jokes were 
designed to resemble prototypical jokes in early development, and, importantly, not to look 
like pretend actions (e.g., Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012). This was to ensure the studies captured 
the essence of joking and pretending without confounding the two. Specifically, we did not 
want to use a joke that looked like pretending, or vice versa. Each child was then tested on 
two pretend trials followed by two joke trials, or vice versa.  Thus for half the children the 
test actions initially matched the context, and for half they did not. Importantly, compared to 
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previous normativity tasks, the test trial actions were all different to the context actions, 
whether contexts and test trials matched or not. This was to ensure children responded to the 
nature and intentions of the contexts and test trials (i.e., that they expressed pretending or 
joking) rather than determining whether children match the exact same wrong actions (see 
Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011, for a discussion). A second independent variable was whether the 
experimenters gave cues that they were joking or pretending, or not. For half the children, the 
experimenters gave cues, and for the other half, they did not. The dependent variable was 
whether children objected to or corrected the action demonstrated by the second 
experimenter.  
Procedure. Each session was conducted by two experimenters.  At the beginning of 
the session both experimenters engaged the child in play until children were comfortable. 
Toys used at this stage were not similar in any way to the toys used during the actual 
experiment.  Once this warm-up stage was over, the experiment began.   
Experimenter 2 (E2) stated she had to leave the room for a moment and did so. Then 
experimenter 1 (E1) brought out the tea set.  In the pretend context of the Cues condition, E1 
said, “Let’s play a game with the tea set! I’m going to pretend with the X [e.g., teacup]”, and 
then performed a pretend action (e.g., pretending to drink from teacup, see Appendix A, 
supplementary materials), and smiled. E1 then said, “Can you do it?” and the child was 
encouraged to have a turn. This was repeated for a total of four pretend actions. In the joke 
context of the Cues condition, E1 said, ‘How about we be really silly? Let’s be really silly 
with the tea set!” E1 then stated, “I’m going to joke with the X [e.g., teacup]”, and then 
performed a joke action (e.g., putting a teacup upside down on her head, see Appendix A) 
and laughed. E1 then said, “Can you do it?” The child was then encouraged to have a turn. 
This was repeated for a total of four joke actions. Regardless of what children did, they were 
given the same feedback: “Good job”. 
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After four actions were demonstrated, E2 entered the room and requested to join in 
their game.  E1 accepted and then left the room saying, “I just need to pop out for a moment – 
I’ll be right back.”  E2 performed two pretend actions followed by two joke actions, or vice 
versa.  Before each action E2 said, “Look at what I can do!” and then performed the action, 
e.g., using the knife to cut the “cake” (really a block, pretend action); or putting the knife 
behind her ear (joke action; see Appendix B for a full list of actions). E2 made sound effects 
and smiled after pretending, and laughed after joking. Please note that all test actions were 
new compared to the actions during training so that participants would not have seen them 
before in the original context. If the child did not object while E2 performed the action, E2 
asked, “Am I playing right?” If the child responded, “yes”, E2 moved onto the next trial.  If 
the child responded “no” or did not respond, E2 asked, “What should I be doing?” and the 
child was given the opportunity to demonstrate.  These prompts were used to encourage 
every opportunity for children to object, and were used regardless of context or test trial 
actions. E2 used the same script whether the action involved pretending or joking, and 
whether it matched the original context or not. Regardless of the feedback children gave, they 
were given the same positive generic feedback at the end of each trial, e.g., “Good job”.  
The No Cues condition was the same as the Cues condition, except when E1 
performed either a joke or pretend action, she said, “Look what I can do”, then performed the 
action, then smiled. E2 followed the same script as the Cues condition, except she never gave 
cues that she was joking or pretending, and smiled after performing an action, regardless of 
whether it involved joking or pretending. Therefore children might assume that experimenters 
were ignorantly making mistakes when joking, even though they were happy (see Hoicka & 
Akhtar, 2011). This is also possibly the case for pretending. E2 was blind to the goals of the 
study, as well as which condition the child was in. 
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Coding. All sessions were coded from videotape. The coding system was based to 
some extent on Rakoczy (2008). If children objected to E2’s behavior (e.g., saying, “No”, or 
“Stop”) immediately, and dictated what they ought to do (e.g., modelling another behavior), 
the trial received a score of 4. If children immediately objected or corrected E2, the score was 
3. If children objected and corrected after a prompt (“Am I playing right?) the score was 2. If 
children objected or corrected after a prompt, the score was 1. If there was no objection or 
correction the score was 0. Seven (13%) of the videos were coded for agreement. The inter-
rater reliability was excellent, weighted Cohen’s Kappa = 0.98.  
Results & Discussion 
The data were skewed, therefore we analyzed data using non-parametric statistics. 
The dependent variables for all analyses were whether children ever objected/ corrected or 
not. We modeled the likelihood of responses using logit mixed effects models with the LME4 
package (Bates, Maechler, & Dai, 2008) in R (R Development Core Team, 2009; see Hoicka 
& Akhtar, 2011; and Jaeger, 2008, for details on how to use this statistic). For each analysis, 
we first built a base model, which included an intercept, and Participant as a random variable. 
Initial analyses found no effects or interactions of Trial Number and Prompting (i.e., whether 
children were prompted, or not, in the case that they spontaneously objected).  
See Figure 1 for the percentage of children who objected, by Cues (Cues, No Cues), 
Training Context (Pretend, Joke), and Test Trial Actions (Pretend, Joke). We show 
information about the percentage of objections which were spontaneous versus prompted. 
However, initial analyses found that using spontaneous objections only gave a weaker 
overview of the data than using all objections, therefore we focus on all objections here. The 
best model (log-likelihood = -93.60, N = 232) found children were significantly more likely 
to object when test trials involved joke actions, Odds-Ratio, OR = 5.50, p = .0002, when the 
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first pair of test trials mismatched the training trials, OR = 4.21, p = .0416, and there was an 
interaction of Cues and Context, OR = 59.92, p = .0044. 
To follow up the interaction, we tested the Cues and No Cues conditions separately. 
The best model for the Cues conditions (log-likelihood = -48.68, N = 120) found children 
were significantly more likely to object when test trials involved joke actions, OR = 4.38, p = 
.0087, when a pretend context was originally established, OR = 9.83, p = .0052, and when the 
first pair of test trials mismatched the training trials, OR = 4.77, p = .0508. There was also an 
interaction of Order and Context, OR = 4.77, p = .0275. 
To follow up the interaction of Order and Context we tested Pretend and Joke 
Contexts separately. The best model for the Pretend Context with Cues (log-likelihood = -
61.57, N = 60) found children were significantly more likely to object when test trials 
involved joke actions, OR = 3.96, p = .0439, and when the first pair of test trials involved 
joke actions, OR = 11.64, p = .0020. See Figure 2 for the percentage of children who 
objected, by Order, in the Pretend Cues condition. 
The base model for the Joke Context was not improved by Action, Order, or the 
interaction of these. Therefore children in the Joke Context objected and corrected equally 
across actions and orders.  
The best model for the No Cues conditions (log-likelihood = -39.61, N = 112) found 
children were more likely to object when test trials involved joke actions, OR = 21.12, p = 
.0116. Planned follow-up analyses looking at each Context on its own found neither Pretend 
nor Joke Contexts on their own were improved by Action. 
 Overall, across conditions, children objected to joke actions more than pretend 
actions, suggesting children view joke actions as more wrong than pretend actions in general. 
This is in line with theory suggesting joking is more wrong than pretending (Hoicka & Gattis, 
2008). 
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Cues were also important. While children in the cues condition could distinguish joke 
and pretend intentional contexts, children in the no cues condition could not. Cues may thus 
be important for helping children to determine the intention behind E1’s game, while a lack 
of cues may have made the intention behind the game unclear. In particular, the joke 
condition with no cues may have just looked like a series of mistakes rather than the set-up of 
a game (see Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). The pretend context without 
cues could have also been interpreted as mistakes (see Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006; 
Rakoczy, et al., 2004).  
There was a general effect of context within the cues conditions such that children 
objected more overall in the pretend condition with cues than the joke condition with cues. It 
is important to note that there was no effect of context in the no cues condition, suggesting 
cues are important to establishing the intentions and hence meanings behind the actions. One 
possibility is that pretending sets up a normative situation where children not only expect E2 
to perform pretend actions, but to perform the same pretend actions as E1 (e.g., Rakoczy, 
2008; Wyman, et al., 2009). A second possibility is that children thought of the pretend 
context with cues as being literal rather than pretending, leading children to try to reinforce 
norms more generally. In contrast, joking might provide a situation where the goal is to 
violate norms, therefore anything and everything might be accepted to a greater degree.  
A third possibility is that children objected more overall to the pretend context 
because they expected E2 to establish trust by initially pretending as well, and for half of the 
children, this was not the case. An order effect found children who participated in the pretend 
context with cues condition protested more overall if E2 initially joked. This suggests 
children judged that E2 was not trustworthy if she initially could not match her actions to the 
original intentional context. Children may have judged E2 as generally incompetent once she 
started performing jokes when the goal was to pretend, and children may have found it 
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difficult to forgive E2, even when she started following the rules of the game. Alternatively, 
once E2 violated the rules of the game, children may have considered E2 to be incompetent, 
and thus held her to a higher standard when eventually pretending, expecting her to do the 
exact same actions to show true competency. 
Interestingly, order effects were not found in any other condition. In the no cues 
conditions, this may be because children did not understand the intentional context, since no 
cues were given (Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2006). In the joke condition with cues, it 
may be the case that children were accepting of all actions as joking gives permission to do 
anything, whether it violates norms of not.  
Study 1b 
Study 1a found that children in the pretend context with cues objected more compared 
to children in the joke context with cues. One possibility is that children thought the pretend 
actions were in fact literal, and so were reluctant to accept violations of literal acts. This is 
unlikely as children responded differently when a pretend context was set up without cues. 
However, to rule out this possibility, in Study 1b, we examined whether children distinguish 
a literal context with cues from the pretend and joke contexts with cues in Study 1a. We also 
sought to determine whether children object more to joke than pretend actions when the 
initial set up is literal, and hence a separate intentional context altogether.  
Method 
Participants. There were 14 two year olds (M = 28 months, 14 days, SD = 3 months, 
15 days, Range = 24 months, 24 days – 34 months, 23 days, 8 male). Nine children were 
Caucasian, 3 were of mixed ethnicity, and 2 parents did not report their child’s ethnicity. All 
children lived in England. Parents had a Postgraduate degree (5), Undergraduate degree (4), 
High School diploma (3), or not reported (2). No participants were excluded. Participants 
were recruited as in Study 1a. 
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Materials. The objects were the same as Study 1a, with the addition of water and rice 
cakes. 
Design. The experiment was a between-subjects (compared to the cues conditions of 
Study 1a) and within-subjects design.  Each participant was trained in the literal context, 
which involved four literal actions.  Each child was then tested on two pretend trials followed 
by two joke trials, or vice versa. The dependent variable was whether children objected to or 
corrected the actions demonstrated by the second experimenter.  
Procedure. This was the same as Experiment 1a, except the initial context was literal.  
E2 stated she had to leave the room for a moment and did so. Then E1 brought out the tea set 
and said, “Let’s have a snack now” and then performed a literal action (e.g., literally drinking 
water from teacup, see Appendix A), and smiled. E1 then said, “Can you do it?” and the child 
was encouraged to have a turn. This was repeated for a total of four literal actions. Regardless 
of what children did, they were given the same feedback: “Good job”. After four actions were 
demonstrated, the experiment continued as in the Cues condition of Study 1a. 
Coding. Coding was the same as Study 1a. Three (21%) of the videos were coded for 
agreement. The inter-rater reliability was perfect, k = 1.00. 
Results & Discussion 
See Figure 1 for the percentage of children who objected, by Action. We ran an 
analysis combining data from the Cues condition (Joke Context, Pretend Context) of Study 1a 
and the Literal Context condition from Study 1b to determine whether children responded 
differently when a literal context was first established. The best model (log-likelihood = -
77.40, N = 176) found children were significantly more likely to object or correct when test 
trials involved joke actions, OR = 5.04, p = .0006. Difference contrasts, comparing Literal to 
both Pretend and Joke Contexts, found children were more likely to object or correct when a 
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Pretend versus Literal Context was established, OR = 4.24, p  = .0371. However, there was 
no difference between the Literal and Joke Contexts. 
We also examined whether children objected to or corrected joke actions more than 
pretend actions when a literal context was established. The best model (log-likelihood = -
23.17, N = 56) found children were more likely to object or correct when test trials involved 
joke actions, OR = 7.25, p = .0389. There was no order effect. 
Study 1b shows toddlers also object more to jokes than pretending when a literal 
context has been initially set up. This gives some support to the view that children in Study 
1a may have thought E1 was being literal rather than pretending in the pretend condition with 
cues. However, combining studies 1a and 1b demonstrates that pretend contexts are not 
viewed as literal contexts. Children object or correct more often after the pretend context with 
cues than the literal context with cues. This may suggest pretending provides a special 
normative context where children are expected to replicate specific pretend actions, or 
perform pretend actions more generally. It may seem surprising that children are more open 
after a literal context has been set up - one that is theoretically more normative than a pretend 
context. However, most of our lives are literal, and so a literal context may not mark out 
anything special, i.e., it may not mark out that the rules of a game are being established. 
Therefore children may make no expectations of a new person when the initial person has 
just acted normally. In contrast, a pretend context may mark out a specific time to play 
according to a set of normative rules (Rakoczy, 2008; Wyman et al, 2009), while a joke 
context may mark out a specific time to play, but to avoid following any rules (Ziv, 1983).  
Study 2 
In Study 1, E2 always performed different actions to E1, even if they followed the 
same intention. In previous research on norms in pretend play the test trials compared the 
same pretend action that E1 performed to a pretend action E1 had not performed, and 
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children objected more to the pretend action E1 had not performed (Rakoczy, 2008). 
Alternatively, E2 either displayed an intention to pretend as E1 did, or to act literally, and 
then in both conditions demonstrated a literal action, that was different to the last pretend 
action E1 had performed (Wyman, et al., 2009). Children objected more when E2 intended to 
match E1’s intention to pretend, but performed a different action, rather than when she did 
not intend to match her intentions. One question this raises is whether children in previous 
research objected more to different actions because they violated the intention to pretend 
more generally, or because they violated the intention to perform specific actions. Similarly, 
perhaps children in the pretend context of the cues condition in Study 1a objected more 
overall simply because all actions, pretend and joke, were different to the original actions set 
up in the initial context. If pretending provides a special normative situation where children 
must follow specific actions, then we would expect toddlers to object and correct more in 
response to E2 performing different pretend actions compared to the same pretend actions as 
E1. However, Study 1a suggests children objected more to pretending when E2 initially 
joked. Therefore it is also possible that children in Study 1a objected to any action more, 
overall, due to children being untrusting of someone who initially went against the intentional 
context of the game (to pretend) rather than the fact that the specific actions did not match. If 
this is the case, and the overall intention to pretend is more important than the exact pretend 
actions displayed, we would expect no difference between same and different pretend actions. 
Method 
Participants. There were 14 two year olds (M = 28 months, 11 days, SD = 3 months, 
2 days, Range = 24 months, 7 days –33 months, 0 days, 9 male). Eleven children were 
Caucasian, 1 was Asian, and 2 were of mixed ethnicity. All children lived in England. Parents 
had a Postgraduate degree (2), Undergraduate degree (8), High School diploma (3), or not 
reported (1). No participants were excluded. Participants were recruited as in Study 1a. 
Distinguishing Pretending and Joking 
18 
 
Materials. The objects were the same as Study 1a. 
Design. The experiment was a within-subjects design.  All participants were trained in 
a pretend context which involved four pretend actions (with cues).  Each child was then 
tested on two pretend trials that were identical to the initial context, and then two pretend 
trials that were different to the initial context, or vice versa (all with cues). Thus for half the 
children the test actions initially matched the context, and for half they did not. The 
dependent variable was whether children objected to or corrected the actions demonstrated by 
the experimenter during test trials.  
Procedure. The initial context was set up by E1 in the same way as the pretend 
context with cues in Study 1a. The different pretend test trials were those performed by E2 in 
Study 1a (with cues). The same pretend test trials were two of the trials that E1 performed 
(see Appendix B)  
Coding. Same as Study 1a. Three (21%) of the videos were coded for agreement. The 
inter-rater reliability was perfect, k = 1.00. 
Results & Discussion 
Children objected on none of the Same trials, and 10.7% (CI = 0%-21.43%) of the 
Different trials. There were no effects of Similarity or Order (Same First, Different First). 
Therefore toddlers do not object more to different pretend actions than the exact ones 
modelled. This suggests pretending does not set up a context where children expect others to 
perform the exact same actions. Instead, this suggests children follow the general intentional 
context (that of pretending) rather than specific actions. Thus it is likely that children 
objected more overall in the pretend context with cues in Study 1a because, for half the 
children, E2 initially violated the general intentional context of the game. Indeed, it is 
interesting to note that the percentage of objections to different pretending is quite similar in 
the pretend condition with cues when E2 first pretends (see Figure 2), and Study 2. This 
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further lends support that the order effect was crucial in interpreting the findings for Study 1a. 
It is also likely that in past research (Rakoczy, 2008; Wyman, et al., 2009) children objected 
more to a different action because it violated the underlying intention of the game, rather than 
because it was simply different to the original. 
General Discussion 
Distinguishing Pretend and Joke Actions 
Study 1 shows 2-year-olds distinguish two types of wrong actions: pretending and 
joking. Thus children do not view these types of acts as the same. When all conditions were 
combined, and when the pretend with cues and literal with cues conditions were analysed on 
their own, children objected to or corrected joke actions more than pretend actions. This 
suggests children found joking to be more wrong overall than pretending. This falls in line 
with previous definitions of pretending and joking. While pretending is technically wrong, it 
is right in one’s imagination (e.g., Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Nichols & Stich, 2003). In 
contrast, joking, at its most basic, need only be wrong (Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). These data 
also converge with naturalistic data demonstrating both parents and toddlers show more 
belief in pretense versus joking, even though both are technically wrong (Hoicka & Butcher, 
in press).  
A question remains as to how children distinguished these action types. First, they 
may have done this based on the cues given during the initial contexts and test trials. This 
might be the case if children only objected more to joking than pretending in the pretend and 
literal contexts with cues. However, Study 1a also found that children objected more to joke 
than pretend actions in the joke and pretend contexts when no cues were given (when 
analysed together). Therefore, it is not the case that cues were required to make this 
distinction. Given the results of the no cues conditions, children must have distinguished joke 
and pretend actions based on the actions themselves to some extent. Indeed, joke actions 
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looked less canonical than pretend actions. This was an intentional part of the design as the 
actions were meant to reflect typical instances of joking and pretending, and in naturalistic 
settings, joke actions do appear to be more wrong than pretend actions (e.g., McCune-
Nicolich, 1981; Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012).  
Cues and Intentions 
While toddlers could distinguish joke and pretend actions on their own, the intentional 
cues also mattered. Children distinguished joke and pretend contexts in Study 1a if cues were 
given, but they did not do so when no cues were given. In particular, in the cues conditions, 
children objected more overall after a pretend context had been set up compared to a joke 
context. This was likely due to order effects, where children objected most of all if E2 
initially joked after E1 pretended, even if she went back to pretending in then end. 
Additionally, they were more likely to object to joke than pretend actions in the pretend 
context with cues, but not in the joke context with cues. This suggests cues are important in 
helping children determine others’ intentions. Therefore being exposed to pretend or joke 
actions alone was not enough for toddlers to accept that the intention of the game was to joke 
or pretend.  
Past research found the word “pretend” helps children identify acts of pretense 
(Rakoczy, et al., 2006), and pretend cues more generally allow toddlers to identify intentions 
to pretend (Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006; Rakoczy, et al., 2004). Therefore the language and 
cues could have signalled to children that E1 intended to pretend, and set up a pretend game. 
Similarly, past research found laughter allows toddlers to distinguish jokes from mistakes 
when actions are the same (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). Study 1 
converges with past research showing that when a pretend intentional context is established, 
children not only copy pretend actions more (Rakoczy, et al., 2004), and reject literal actions 
more (Wyman, et al., 2009), but also expect others to match the intentional context. It also 
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converges with past research showing that when a humorous intentional context is 
established, children not only copy wrong actions more (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; Hoicka & 
Gattis, 2008), but also protest against them less. 
Study 1 suggests children tracked the intentions behind the contexts, rather than the 
specific actions only. This may suggest children not only distinguish intentions to pretend 
from trying (Rakoczy, et al., 2004), and humorous intentions from mistakes (Hoicka & 
Gattis, 2008), but also distinguish two types of intentions to do the wrong thing, joking and 
pretending, from 2 years. This is therefore potentially the earliest point at which children 
understand that people can intend to do the wrong thing for different reasons, earlier than 
distinguishing lying from joking, pretending, or irony from lies (Andrews, et al., 1986; 
Leekam, 1991; Sullivan, et al., 1995; Taylor, et al., 2003; Winner & Leekam, 1991). This in 
turn indicates that young children distinguish the meanings behind different types of 
intentions, showing a deeper understanding of intentions beyond only understand that acts 
can be intentional or unintentional (e.g., Carpenter, et al., 1998; Sakkalou & Gattis, 2013).  
Normative vs. Permissive Environments 
One of our original predictions was that we may find an interaction of contexts and 
actions in the cue conditions. Within the pretend context with cues, children objected to jokes 
more than pretending. However we did not find that children objected more to pretending 
than joking in the joke context with cues. This suggests children did not construe pretend and 
joke intentional contexts as situations invoking specific norms to pretend or joke respectively. 
Instead, children interpreted the intentions more broadly. When a pretend context was 
introduced with cues, children were more likely to object to actions in the test trials than if 
either a literal or joke context with cues had been introduced. These findings suggest a 
pretend context should be treated seriously. Children were not only more likely to object to 
joke actions after a pretend context had been established, but they were also more likely to 
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object to pretend actions, in particular if E2 performed joke actions first. This converges with 
evidence that pretend contexts help children to practice normative structures and learn and 
generalize information in the real world (e.g., Hopkins, Dore, & Lillard, 2015; Rakoczy, 
2008; Sutherland & Friedman, 2012, 2013; Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013; Wyman, et al., 2009). 
Therefore, in the current study, toddlers may have objected to such a great extent during the 
pretend context with cues because the intentional context dictated learning about serious 
information, and so introducing norm-violating information could have been seen as violating 
the underlying intentional context of learning.  
In contrast, after a joke context with cues, anything goes. Whether E2 pretended or 
joked during test trials, children were less likely to object to E2 overall. Children were also 
no more likely to object to joke than pretend actions, or vice versa. Joke intentional contexts 
may signal a space in which norms may be violated, allowing any type of action, pretend or 
joke, to be accepted to a greater degree. This converges with evidence that joking contexts 
prime people to be more creative (e.g., Ziv, 1983). Thus not only do young children 
distinguish pretending and joking, but these two types of wrong acts may help form the bases 
of two different aspects of cultural evolution: transmission and innovation (e.g., Mesoudi, et 
al., 2004). Pretending may help transmit culture to children, while joking may allow children 
to accept innovation (and perhaps innovate themselves). Future research should explore these 
possibilities. 
It is intriguing that a pretend context should elicit more normativity than a literal 
environment, which, technically, adheres to norms to a greater extent than pretending. One 
way to explain this is that most of our lives involve acting literally. Therefore, when toddlers 
saw E1 act literally, it may have created no expectations as to how E2 should act. They may 
have thus objected more to joke than pretend actions due to the actions themselves, rather 
than the intentional contexts, as in the no cues conditions. 
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Same vs. Different Actions 
In previous studies on normativity and pretense (e.g., Rakoczy, 2008; Wyman, et al., 
2009), the question was whether children objected more when E2 claimed to follow the same 
intentional (pretend) context as E1, but did a different action to that modelled by E1. In Study 
1, the pretend and joke test actions were all novel compared to the actions in the initial 
contexts. Therefore the pretend test trial actions were different to the pretend context actions. 
Thus children might not have expected E2 to do just any pretend actions to appropriately join 
in the game. Rather, children may have expected E2 to do the same specific pretend actions 
E1 had modelled. This could explain why children objected in the pretend context with cues 
more than the joke context with cues overall. However, Study 2 found children did not object 
more when E2 performed different pretend actions rather than the same pretend actions as 
E1, suggesting that it is not the specific actions that count, but the general intentional context. 
This suggests the results of past research on pretending and normativity were not necessarily 
led by children rejecting E2’s actions because they were not exactly the same as E1’s (e.g. 
Wyman, et al., 2009), but instead gives support to the idea that children were following rules 
to match intentions to pretend more generally. This also lends support to the idea that it was 
the order effect, when E2 joked before pretending after E1 pretended, that best explains why 
children objected so much in the pretending with cues condition.  
Trust  
The results of the pretend context with cues in Study 1 suggests that if E2 initially 
performed actions following the same intentions as E1, children were more likely to accept 
E2’s general competence, even when she later performed actions following a different 
intention type. In contrast, if E2 initially performed actions following different intentions to 
E1, children were more likely to reject E2’s general competence, even when she later 
performed actions in line with the original context. Therefore E2’s initial ability to follow a 
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type of intentional game structure had longer term consequences for children’s faith in E2. 
This finding has interesting parallels to the literature on Trust in Testimony where children 
continue to mistrust an informant who was previously inaccurate (e.g., Harris & Koenig, 
2006; Koenig & Harris, 2005). Given that pretending may constitute an environment for 
learning (e.g. Hopkins, et al., 2015; Sutherland & Friedman, 2012, 2013; Weisberg & 
Gopnik, 2013), trust may be of particular importance during a pretend versus joking, or even 
literal context.  
Conclusions 
The current studies are the first to find children distinguish pretending and joking. 
Children do so in three ways. First, children were more likely to reject joke actions than 
pretend actions overall suggesting children view joke actions as more wrong than pretend 
actions. Second, children were more likely to reject any actions after a pretend context versus 
a joke context, or even a literal context. However, this was only the case when intentional 
cues were used, and was driven by an order effect in which children objected in particular 
when E2 first joked after E1 pretended. This suggests children distinguish the intentional 
nature of pretending and joking, indicating they may understand the meaning behind different 
types of wrong acts. This also suggests a pretend context establishes specific rules to be 
followed, while a joke context allows an open space to perform various types of acts. Finally, 
children did not object more when E2 performed pretend actions which were the same or 
different to E1, suggesting it is the intentional context which matters, rather than the specific 
actions. 
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Figure Captions 
Fig 1. Percentage of trials children objected or corrected by test actions, contexts, and cues in 
Studies 1a and 1b. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of spontaneous and 
prompted objections and corrections combined. 
Fig 2. Percentage of trials children objected or corrected by test actions and order in the 
pretend context with cues condition in Study 1a. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals of spontaneous and prompted objections and corrections combined. 
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